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1 
DISMANTLING NORMATIVITY 
IN INDIAN ETHICS - FROM 
VEDIC ALTARITY TO THE 
GITA'S ALTERITY* 
Purushottama Bilimoria 
This chapter begins with moral thinking in early India - the Vedic period -
and the normative ethics that was developed then, in fledgling fashion, largely 
on the imperatives of a ritual cosmology and its aligned rites discourse. In 
due course of time, as perspectives changed, moral dilemmas and antinomies 
and irresoluble conflicts came to the surface - with other shifts occurring in 
the fabric of society. Vedic norms came increasingly into question, under-
mining the erstwhile nonnative structuration, confidence, violence, and power 
that this kind of formative moral plank - supposed to embody the originary 
and founding insights of Indian ethics and law - made possible or sanctioned. 
The chapter analyzes the rethinking and deconstruction of this transcendental 
framework during the classical period - when the Epics and the Bhagavad-
Gftii emerged with a stronger social and self-reflexive conscience. The legacy 
of this period and the texts/textuality therefrom have left a large gap in the 
more logocentrically gounded Indian ethics - with which philosophers, jurists, 
ethicists, and political thinkers are still grappling. 
I In the beginning ... without beginning 
I begin with the oft-cited platitude that the early Indian people - perhaps 
like human beings everywhere in their practical moral judgments - placed 
on the side of the ~~good" such values as happiness~ health, survival, prog-
eny, pleasure, calmness, friendship, knowledge, and truth. On the side of the 
"bad" were, more or less, their opposites or disvalues: misery or suffering, 
sickness and injury, death, barrenness, pain, anger, enmity, ignorance or 
error, and untruth. These positive and negative qualities are universalized, 
in principle at least, for all sentient beings~ for it was felt that the highest 
19 
PURUSHOTTAMA BILIMORIA 
good is possible when the whole world (gods included) can enjoy the good 
things that the cosmos has to offer. The summum bonum, however, expresses 
itself in the total harmony or homology of the cosmic and natural order 
characterized as rta: this highest good is the telos, the creative purpose and 
motivation that underpins human behavior. The prescribed pattern of social 
and moral order is thus conceived as a correlate - the perfect correspond-
ence of the natural order. This is the totality of the ordered course of things, 
and therefore speaks, linguistically, i.e. in speech (vaeya), to the truth of 
being or reality (sat) and hence underwrites the "Law" (or the "natural 
law"), transcendentally (J.?gVeda 1.123.9; IV.51.5; V.S; X.300.1.2). The preem-
inent authority for this ontology that grounds the concomitant ethics is the 
Vedas. Their contents are simply "seen" or "heard" (srutl); the "revealed" 
speech is authorless, for "in the beginning there was neither being (sat) nor 
non-being (asat)," and yet "Vae (Speech) the first-born of Truth (satya) 
spoke forth." (Here, it is to be noted, the usual Judeo-Christian idea of a 
God to whom the source of the scriptures is owed is lacking or absent. 1) 
Conversely, the principles inscribed in the Vedas are embodied in the gods 
(the polymorphic pantheon of deities, immortal benign spirits or angelic 
beings, demonic counterparts as remnants of the first failed sacrifices) who 
serve as models and exemplary icons for human conduct. But the gods 
themselves are not in any deep ontological sense the "Other" either, for 
they are considered, via one preeminent hermeneutic reading of the chants 
or invocatory hymns (mantras), as emergently effervescent light-beings of 
pure mantric-effect. The quasi-divine beings, not lacking in consciousness 
or intentionality, but not necessarily representing transcendental conscience 
(a Heideggerean requirement) either, are therefore predisposed to being 
internalized or rendered as superintending agencies who will by dint of the 
operative autonomous law safeguard, for a deferred delivery, the apurva or 
the efficacious traces of the rites of sacrifice performed on the altar-ity of fire 
as decreed. The authority then rests centrally with the texts or the linguistic 
"auctor" with an episteme that recedes into immemorial traditions of the 
hoary past (or of no-time, perhaps). 
How far, though, this trope of "authority" unpacks in real moral terms, 
and impacts on the social lives of people, are issues that cannot be taken up 
fully in this short treatment,. but are taken up in forthcoming work entitled 
Indian Ethics, Classical and Contemporary (Ashgate). Nevertheless, there are 
certain larger schemata and their structural impacts that are picked up in 
later traditions - including Buddhist critiques of the Brahmanical morality 
and its excesses - that we need to consider. 
Here a particular principle of social ordering is adopted (probably intro-
duced into India by the Aryans around 2000 BCE), according to which 
society is organized into a fourfold (but originally threefold) functional 
division or "class" scheme, called var{la (literally, "colour" or "category"). 
These are, with their respective preserves, namely, brahma1J.a (brahmin), for 
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religious and educational tasks; k$atriya, for sovereign and defence tasks; 
vaisya, for agriculture and economic tasks; and sikira, for menial tasks. (One 
is reminded here of Plato's "stations-of-life" division.) Overall, the sources 
of power get distributed evenly at different places, and ideally differences in 
function need not entail differences in interests, rights, and privileges; but 
the outcome in practice shows otherwise. A system of sub-divisions or "castes' 
Utitf) further proliferates in the class functions, gradually turning vaYl)a into 
a discriminatory, hereditary-based institution. In any event, the brahmins 
certainly enjoy the better end of the system and they wield enormous power. 
A life-affirming but rigidly casuistic morality develops. In Max Weber's 
judgment, the Vedas "do not contain a rational ethic" - if such an ethic did 
exist anywhere that far back (Weber, 1958, 261, 337)! 
Vedic authority becomes normative in the later periods also; the Vedas 
are invoked as the source of ethics. To be noted is one other important 
institution, where three morally significant concepts emerge, namely, asrama, 
dharma, and karma (or karman), culminating in the ethical concept of 
purutjarthas - kingdom of ends - all of which are central to classical Hindu 
ethics. But before giving an overview of these concepts, one further point 
awaits mentioning. 
In this Vedic ethical system one's actions are consistent with that 
which promotes the good so perceived, and one should desist from doing 
that which promotes or stimulates the bad so that the rta is not unduly 
disturbed. An act is therefore right if it conforms to this general principle, 
and an act is wrong if it contravenes it (and so is anrta, or dis-order) (l;?.g Veda 
X.87.11; X.125.5). Since to do what is right safeguards the good of all qua 
rta (the factual/descriptive order), it is assumed that it is more or less oblig-
atory to do or perform the right acts (the "ought" or moral/prescriptive 
order). This convergence of the cosmic and the moral orders is universally 
commended in due course in the all-embracing appellation of dharma (from 
its earlier sense of "religious ordinances and fixed principles") (l;?.g Veda 
IV.53.3; VII.89.5). 
The "right" or rightness is simply identified with "rite": it is formalized, 
taking in varying contexts (i.e. the obligation that is derived from a value, 
say, survival of the race, becomes the sui generic value itself; e.g., sacri-
fice, regardless of what is offered in the act). Rite now comes to possess an 
intrinsic moral worth and it becomes the defining normative frame of just 
about every moral value valorized. 
Thereafter rite tends to assume, as it were, an imperious power all of its 
own, and people forget the original motivation or rationale underlying the 
imperative. Herein lies the originary violence in this ethical tradition, for 
laws are taken advantage of by the nobles (dryas), who form themselves into 
an elite and dictate the terms of priestly and ritual performatives. It loses its 
heteronymous imperative. Rites become increasingly pursued by individual 
wills for egoistic ends, optatively, and are adjudged in respect of their utility. 
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One group claims knowledge and therefore privilege over others in accord-
ance with the (prescribed) rites, their correct performance, utility, and so on. 
This leads to the establishment of differential duties and moral codes for 
the elite and major groups or "classes" in society. Each "class" constitutes 
a needful functional unit in the larger complex. The stages or lifecycles an 
individual goes through may entail distinct or differently arranged moral 
rules, roles, and goals or values for the group or sub-group he or she belongs 
to. Likewise for kings and rulers, with added responsibilities and privileges. 
Differentia are superimposed on the organic unity of nature. A kind of 
oblique distributive justice is assumed, and in time the question of moral 
choice is categorically left out: one either does it or one does not, and enjoys 
the rewards or suffers the consequences thereof. Herein lie the rudiments of 
the idea of karma, which we develop later. 
What counts as ethics, then, is largely the normative preoccupations; 
the justification is usually that this is the "divine" ordering of things (in the 
sense of locating the order in some transcendental plenum or law, depicted 
in the imageless and, later, iconic gods, not necessarily in an absolute or 
supremely existent being, as God). This is akin to the ancient, especially 
the Stoics', conception of Natural Law in the Western tradition. This may 
also provide a basis for belief in the absoluteness of the moral law from 
which the rules and norms are supposed to have been derived. But virtually 
no attempt is made, until perhaps much later, or elsewhere in the broad 
tradition, at self~reflexively analyzing the logic of the ethical concepts and 
reasoning used. Indeed, questions such as: "What do we mean when we say 
of an action that it is morally right (or morally wrong)?" can hardly be said 
to have attracted the kind of critical attention afforded in (meta-)ethical 
thinking in recent times. 
That is not to say, however, that genuine issues, concerns, and paradoxes 
of ethical relevance are not raised, even if they are couched in religious, 
mystical, or mythological ideas or terms. To give an illustration: Scriptures 
proscribe injury to creatures and meat-eating, but a priest would wrong the 
gods if be did not partake of the remains of a certain ritual animal sacrifice. 
With the gods wronged, rta can not be maintained: what then should he do 
(Kane, 1968-9, vol. I.i, 1-3)? It also follows that meat-eating is not unam-
biguously decried in the Scriptures, as more recent studies have attempted 
to show. However, that qualification or thinking over paradoxical scenarios 
merely is not sufficient by itself, for exceptions do not constitute the weight 
and strength of much of the moral norms that govern the daily lives and 
affairs of the people. Despite the persistence of the ritualistic Weltanschauung, 
texts from across the counter~traditions (srama1J,a), such as the Jaina and 
the more deconstructive Buddhist, are evocative of certain more humanistic 
virtues and ethical ideals, such as being truthful (satya), giving (dana), 
restraint (dama) , austerities (tapas), affection and gratitude, fidelity, for-
giveness, non-thieving, non-cheating, giving others their just desert Uustice), 
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avoiding injury or hilJ'lSii to all creatures~ and being responsive to the guest! 
stranger. As the gods of the Veda,2 who portray these ideals, recede from 
people's consciousness, they are encouraged to take more responsibility upon 
themselves, and transform these ideals into virtues, habits, and dispositions, 
with corresponding moral "objects" in the world. Old ethical problems 
achieve new meaning. Thus the question of whether the princely god Indra 
should slay the obstructive demon Vrtra becomes a question for the king: 
should he vanquish the ascetics who stand in the way of his sovereignty 
(O'Flaherty, 1985, 177-99, 192)1 
What we have presented here is, admittedly, a sweeping account that 
essentially covers the very early period (c. 1800-800 BeE) during which 
time the Brahmanical tradition grew and flourished, but not without its own 
deeper uncertainties. The Vedic bards had deep insights into and knowledge 
of moral and spiritual goods qua the desirable goods; however, they were 
largely at sea as to what the procedural rules for just distribution and a 
social order without the encumbrances of a hieratic structure that embeds 
iniquitous arrangements would be like. They had some, albeit inarticulate 
and ill-defined inkling of this grounding vision. Nevertheless, the picture 
just sketched provides a general framework within which we can continue to 
see how moral consciousness, certain ethical concepts, and various, albeit 
conflicting, moral schemes are questioned, developed further, and articulated 
in later periods, which may collectively be identified as the "Hindu" tradition. 
(For this account we shall have to use more Sanskrit terms, as their exact 
English equivalents, and the converse, are wanting.) 
IT Historicization of the moral 
In time, this faith in the "divinely" or transcendentally prescribed normative 
framework came under considerable scrutiny. Indian thinkers in the classical 
period, like their counterparts elsewhere, recognized morality'S pervasiveness 
throughout human life and culture, and the need for stability in this area; 
however, they did not shy away from enquiry into the foundations of mor-
ality, the meaning of "right" and "wrong~' or "good" and "bad." Reflecting 
upon the meanings or applications of these judgments has been their way 
of putting theory, if theory it is, into practice. This is also a meta-ethical 
concern, but with a difference. In much of Indian philosophy, one does not 
witness moral thinkers starting with discursive, critical theory, or theoretical 
reflection on first principles, axiomatic propositions, intuition, emotive judg-
ments, and so on. Rather they begin with the practices that are embedded or 
grounded in all human cognitive and, perhaps, aesthetic efforts. Over time 
these practices may come to be embodied in a tradition, in comprehensive 
doctrines, or articulated in texts foreshadowed by, and prefiguring, other 
texts. Initially the adherents seem not to be too disposed toward asking 
questions about their own beginnings - historical or conceptual3 - but they 
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are nevertheless aware of the heterogeneity of their rules, principles, practices, 
and the challenges presented in the moral dilemmas, antinomies, ethical 
quiddities, vagueness, and uncertainties threatening to destabilize the very 
grounds and presuppositions of their moral belief. Hence the subsequent 
hermeneutic and critical exegesis and deconstruction of these practices via 
texts yield variant interpretations, alternative models of ethics, and also 
departures in protocols or laws in the sense of practical wisdom (akin to 
Aristotle's phronesis), as we shall see occur down through the history of 
Indian ethics as we progress through this chapter. 
In the latter case, detached thinking about morality - as in science and 
logic - seems to be less important than living precariously by the rules and 
principles one believes in, or which are part of the community's repertoire 
into which an individual has been born, educated, and raised. One does not 
live by theory alone, if one lives by theory at all. Spinoza reminded the West 
of its first "calling" to ethics in this regard, and his method was not one 
dictated by science but by the human imaginary of natural reason and the 
full range of human interests, desires, feelings, and passions. More recently, 
Levinas has argued for the primacy of ethics over ontology (as ontotheology) 
and metaphysics, where ethics is defined as a concrete response to - the face 
of - the other. As Diane Moira Duncan (2001, 26) put it: "Ethics begins 
when one becomes accused (that is, called into question) by the singular and 
exceptional appearance of the face (a particular face) as the enigma among 
phenomena."4 And deconstruction underpins the ethics of alterity. There is 
indeed evidence that something of this "interruption" and shift had begun 
to occur within the corpus - or in some part thereof - of the Vedas them-
selves. The Vedas are not as homogeneous as the Orientalists in the nine-
teenth century and their mimics in the twentieth century had assumed. If 
certain norms are not questioned and extended to embrace elements of 
differance to at least contend with the heteronymous will and with the 
heterogeneity of the surrounding culture that stare their composers in their 
face, some indeed are. There is thus some space for variation, or at least a 
variant self-understanding, that permits the Vedic sensibility to turn its gaze 
as it were from the heavens or the gods to the human fellow closer in their 
personal and social space. 
Laurie Patton picks out one such insight and articulates this, drawing 
on the Levinasian vocabulary of alterity. In her paper, "Stranger's fire: a 
Levinasian approach to Vedic ethics" (2006), Patton begins by briefly trac-
ing the recent move away from the absolute and toward the contextual and 
situational in the study of Hindu ethics. Recent studies of the Veda have 
focused on the "other," but more exclusively on the non-Aryan other, rather 
than on the "other" who makes moral obligations on the self. She thus turns 
to read Vedic passages as Levinas has read the Talmud. She reviews the basics 
of the Vedic world in terms of the better-known iirya/diisa, or noble/slave, 
iirya/aniirya, Aryan/non-Aryan dominance. More significantly, following 
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Levinas, Patton goes on to look at Vedic ideas of "face" (mukha and related 
phrases) and the face that makes a claim upon one's attention, as well as 
"presence" and "being in the presence" of someone ("prati," and related 
words). She ends by examining the notions of the moral obligations of the 
Vedic guest, or stranger (atthi) at the threshold. Patton is right: there is 
obviously complexity in the idea of the Vedic "other"; while the Vedic 
attitude expresses the kind of "annihilation" of the other that we see in the 
Aryan/non-Aryan discourse, it also contains the very basic understand-
ing that strangers can have a kind of infinite moral claim upon the Vedic 
self, and that this claim can structure certain ethical understandings in the 
Vedic world. 
This act of being present to the guest, or stranger, is also connected with 
the idea of the "gift" (dana), of giving; there is the "gifting" by way of 
sacrifice (yajiia) to the gods, to the cosmos, to the "act of gift" itself (the 
non-transitive gifting: the sacrifice sacrificing itself in sacrifice in the pri-
mordial creation of the cosmos and gods also from non-existence). But the 
conceptual finesse of the idea of the "gift" (diina) had to await a more 
thoroughgoing deconstruction of the dominant features of the nonnative 
Vedic framework that continued to privilege a certain class (caste) and its 
ordained agency ahead of all else and of the larger other (Heim, 2006). This 
articulation, although by no means its total rectification or reform, had to 
await the emergence of the medieval texts of the Dharmasiistras, where a 
further connection is made between the act of giving, making the "gift/' and 
the spontaneity of virtuous performance which is not mediated by some 
principle ("ought I or ought I not do this?"). 
ill The dharma of ethics and the ethics of dharma 
Now I wish to demonstrate how the gradual process of the deconstruction 
and reconstruction of the normative Vedic moral framework undermines 
the latter and heralds in new - even if not a patently radical - conception 
of the framing Grund or grounding framework of ethics. It occurs in this 
instance - or perhaps a better of showing it is - through three heteronymous 
ethical concepts that have never remained as absolute as the preeminent 
Vedic imperative norms had. And these concepts foreshadow the trajectory 
for all future and post-ethical thinking in Indian classical as much as in 
the contemporary milieu (just as "divine law", duty, utility, rights, alterity, 
vagueness, virtue, etc. have tended to become in Western/modern ethical 
thinking). These concepts are the ubiquitous dharma, karma, and puru$iirtha, 
and their relative topoi or place and ousia in the discourse ofJreedom (mok$a). 
We start with dharma. 
"Dharma," it is to be noted, is an all-embracing concept and is perhaps 
unique to Indian thought. But the term is also rather diffuse as it has many 
and varying meanings, ranging from "ordinance, usage, duty, right, justice, 
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morality, virtue, religion, good works, function or characteristics" to "norm," 
"righteousness," "truth" and "law," beside much else (Kane, 1968-9, vol. I.i, 
1-3). 
The word is derived from the Sanskrit root dhr, meaning to form, uphold, 
support, maintain, sustain, to hold together. It certainly connotes the idea 
of that which maintains, gives order and cohesion to any given reality, and 
ultimately to nature, society, and the individual. As will be noticed, dharma 
takes over from the organic unity trope enshrined in rta and shifts more 
towards the human and earthly dimension. In this respect it parallels Hegel's 
idea of Sittlichkeit (the actual ethical order that regulates the conduct of the 
individual, family, civil life, and state) more than it does Kant's ideal concep-
tion of the Moral Law, which is more individualistic, legalistic, and absolutist, 
and could even be said to place value on self-regarding over the other. 
La~ writers such as Kautilya and Manu bring the notion of dharma even 
more down to earth by devising a comprehensive system of social and moral 
regulations for each of the different groups, sub-groups (caste, rulers, etc.) 
within the Hindu social system, as well as specifying certain universal duties 
encumbent on all. Vocational niches, duties, norms, and even punishments 
are differently arranged for different groups, and the roles and requirements 
also vary in the different asrama stages for the different groups. Thus, while 
a wife of a "twice-born" (the three higher classes) may take part in a Vedic 
rite, a sudra would be risking punishment if he so much as hears the Vedas 
recited - to say nothing of those who fall outside the caste structure (ca1Jf!alas), 
and other aliens (Manusmrti, rr.16, 67; X.127). 
More often than not, though, dharma is invoked as though it were an 
utterly objective possibility, but there is no theory of moral realism that 
would cover over the perspectivism of the heteronymous. In fact, it merely 
gives an overall form to a system of positive law and regulations of indi-
viduals and of groups, the specific contents of which are determined by 
various different factors, among which the voice of tradition, convention or 
custom, and the conscience of the learned, might be predominant. Dharma 
then provides a frame that, as it were, could flick through different pictures 
of what is ethically proper or desirable at anyone time. What gives coher-
ence to the conception itself is perhaps its coveted appeal to the need to 
preserve the organic unity of being, to "make" justice where fairness is due, 
and to minimize the burden of karma, if not also to free the individual from 
its encumbrances. But what do we understand by the term karma, which 
is even rather popular nowadays outside India? It is important to consider 
this concept next as here the burden of heteronymity weighs even more 
onerously on the dead-weight of the traditional normativity, for in the 
Bhagavad-Gftii especially it serves to ground a damning critique of faith in 
the pure and simple causal efficacy of prescribed rites: the moral ramifica-
tions of any action - be it a conduct, thought, or a rite - are not exempt 
from the autonomous law of karma. 
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The basic idea behind karma is that every conscious act (cognitive, speech, 
etc.) and volitional action (physical, psychical, etc.) an individual engages in 
generates causal conditions for more than the immediately visible effect, 
such that the net effect, N, of an action X may manifest itself at a later time 
t1, or perhaps its traces (viisanas) get distributed over time ~. Action X may 
combine the residual effects of action Y to generate a compounded, or even 
a reduced, effect in some future moment. And this in turn becomes a critical 
determinant of another action, Z, or a state of affairs pertaining to that 
particular individual (perhaps even a collective). The effect of Z might be 
pleasurable (sukha) or it might be painful and induce suffering (dul:zkha), 
but this is the retribution entailed in the causal network that is itself an 
inexorable manifestation of dharma. 
This linkage of dharma and karma has the following consequences: there 
are no "accidents of birth" determining social inequities; mobility within 
one lifetime is however not rigidly excluded; one has one's dharma, both as 
endowment and as a social role. One either accumulates an improvement in 
karma aiming towards a better life, here and hereafter, or one tries to sunder 
the Gordian knot and opt to step off once and for all from the circus of 
cyclic existence or samsara, as this condition is known in Indian religious 
thought. But this is not achieved as simply as it is willed. Indeed, this freedom 
is placed as the fourth and the most difficult of goals in the fourfold, categor-
ical ends or puru:jiirthas, literally, "the ends sought by human beings," and 
that too not without fulfillment of each of the preceding ends. Again, while 
this axiology is a reconstruction from the Dharmasastra period, in intent it 
also serves to destabilize the monolithic Vedic preoccupation with sacrifice 
as an external act within certain prescribed and confined performatives. 
PurWliirtha inscribes the idea that there are four avenues or goals as the 
"kingdom of ends" of volitional pursuits in life which are of intrinsic value, 
namely: artha, material interests; klima, pleasure and affective fulfillment; 
dharma, again, social and individual duties; and mok~a, liberation or gradual 
detachment from the cares of the three preceding goals of life. They mayor 
may not be continuous with each other, though one goal might prove to be 
of instrumental value for achieving another, as is often thought of dharma 
in connection with mok~a. But mok~a - liberation - is a fortiori the plenum 
of freedom without which dharma as morality - along with the "ethical 
ends" of artha and klima - is all but baseless, or mere means, i.e. utility, to 
some instrumentally conceived end. Still, an ascending scale might well be 
admitted; and the determination of the relative status of each category could 
lead to the next; but mok$a as freedom in this sense is a presupposition, the 
pre-theoretic possibility, more than an "end" in the cumulative sense, as is 
often thought. This contention, however, is the subject of much vigorous 
debate in Indian philosophy. 
What is significant is that the above conception of human ends provides 
a distinct backdrop for the detailed working out of the rules, conduct, and 
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guidelines in respect of the institutions of var~ (caste) and iiSrama (life 
cycles), inasmuch as any individual will want to strive towards achieving the 
best in terms of these ends within the limits of his or her temperament, 
circumstances, status, and so on. Sometimes it is a question of balance; at 
other times it is a question of which interests or preferences take priority 
over which. For example, a twice-born in the third stage might consider that 
he has discharged his social obligations (dharma), so that his remaining 
interest (even challenge) is to edge towards liberation, by becoming a full-
time ascetic. As to what he should do and what he should not do in pursuit 
of this end, this is left entirely to his own determination, for which he relies 
on his meditative and cognitive insights. His dharma is the correlate of 
his innate constitution, of which he alone is the master: thus an inward-
attentive praxis is the source of the principles for his ethic. Here, it may be 
observed, the gap between intuition and ethics is very nearly closed over. 
This is another salient feature of Indian ethics. 
Mok$a, construed as absolute inner freedom, appears to be the only natural 
right one has any claim to, for it is an a priori or transcendental right; but 
again it is not achieved without prior fulfillment of duties and obligations 
implied in the preceding stages of the life-cycle. These may comprise obliga-
tions towards offspring and kin as well as the performance of obligatory 
rites prescribed in the dharma manuals, in terms of what is owed (or in old 
English "ought") to them for their contributions towards the continuing 
welfare of human beings, indeed the other. In addition, one has the obligation 
of making gifts (dana) and offering libations (homa). Duties and obligations, 
in this cosmic perspective, are what make the world go round. What is signi-
ficant here is the recognition of the presence of the other and the heteronym-
ous responsibilities this entails. The ends, especially artha, kama, and dharma, 
have a distributive - rather than a threatening or coercively retributive -
impulse: one engages in commerce with the other, within defined rules; one 
partakes of pleasure in the company or union of the other, and one's duties 
are intentionally in relation to the other (one may have to consider oneself 
as an-other as well, and be mindful therefore of the duties towards oneself 
or the ramifications of its neglect in regard to the other). 
The king, too, has certain obligations toward the other, namely, to pro-
tect the citizens and their interests and to do right by them. Whether the 
law-makers who laid down these particular regal obligations had in their 
mind the correlative "rights" of citizens (as distinct from their interests) 
remains a matter of interpretation. For, if dharma sets the limits and con-
straints on the action of citizens and kings alike, then one cannot say that 
obligations are entailed by the corresponding rights of others. And recipro-
cally, certain rights are granted to the citizens in order to protect the people 
against the king's Machiavellian tyranny. 
One may nevertheless ask, how is it that the brahmin continued to claim 
or appropriate certain rights with respect to the performance of rituals? In 
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consonance with Vedic teachings, rituals had to be performed in certain 
prescribed ways for them to be binding and effective. But this is a procedural 
requirement, i.e. the claim is that whoever is qualified should perform this 
according to the rules. It is therefore an impersonal entitlement, although 
later texts. as we saw, fixed the brahmin as the most qualified agent for the 
task. And this entitlement soon becomes a matter of inheritance. For the 
law-makers like Kautilya and Manu, the vanJas (vocational groupings or 
"castes") are arranged in a descending order and it is this scale that deter-
mines the claimable entitlements, privileges, and obligations, as well as punish-
ments and violations, encumbent upon each member of the group. 
IV The Bhagavad-Gita's interruption 
The strong positive and exclusivist rights, however, that were reserved for 
the upper caste under this arrangement, are severely undermined as we 
move further into the epic period where the Mahiibhilrata,5 especially, and 
the Bhagavad-Gftil (GUil, for short, and BG for textual reference), which is 
one of its major books, reigns in a damning critique of not only the norm-
ative caste order but also the moral imperatives of rites and sacrifices that 
had as yet not been unseated - even through the Dharmasastra period. The 
central core-legend of this encyclopedic all-purpose collection is the family 
feud, culminating in a battle on the plains of Kuruk~etra (near Hastinapura, 
north of present-day Delhi) between the Kauravas (led by Duryodhana and 
BhI~ma), and the pal}.Q.avas (led by Yudhi~thira, the rival heir-apparent, 
and Arjuna). 
Every attempt to resolve the conflict and to avert the battle had dismally 
failed. It was not as though all the parties involved had unanimously agreed 
to go to war; throughout the episode there was a great deal of resistance, 
and anxieties were expressed about the consequences of war, for in war there 
are no victors and much carnage is brought about, and those for whom the 
war is waged usually get slain or wounded anyway. This "mystique force of 
law" qua dharma is born of an epistemic violence as in jusnaturalism (the 
tradition following the radicialization of the founding Grecoid ~'rule of law" 
Gewalt, droit, in Judeo-Christian theology (Derrida, 1990). Dharma in the 
Epic even has a personal incarnation: in Prince Yudhi~thira, the head of the 
Pal}.Q.ava brothers who are on the verge of a battle with their half-brothers, 
the Kauravas, who claim to being the true heirs of their clan's fiefdom. If 
the king of Dharma-incarnate succeeds in the battle, despite the portentous 
sacrifices entailed, then a renewed era of social harmony could be reined in, 
a new order of dharma. Intriguingly, the symbol of "sacrifice" here is trans-
posed from the erstwhile Vedic ritual act to the context of war as a way of 
extirpatingldeconstructing a declining moral order (adharma), and replen-
ishing it with a new social order. In Madeleine Biardeau's reading, as Julian 
Woods translates this for us, the dispute over the throne is the cuhnination 
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of a social malaise originating in the progressive breakdown of the tradi-
tional functional relationship between the two upper (and dominant) caste 
groups, the brahmins and k~atriyas, the two pillars of epic society (Woods, 
2001, 10). This amounts to a progressive reversal of the natural order of 
things down the generation. The Bhagavad-Gitii underscores the disputa-
tion and the pending collapse of the moral order in the form of a dialogue 
on the eve of the battle, the "great sacrifice" (which is another way in which, 
following Biardeau, the Mahiibharata has been read).6 
The multivalent nature of the Gita makes it difficult, however, to reduce 
its core thesis to a simple proposition. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is 
a decisive reexamination and trans-evaluation of the preceding tradition 
from the perspective of its less stable (conceptual and social) concerns. The 
Brahmanical tradition that hitherto had a strong hold over life and its 
organizational aspects (the moral order of things) in India for many cen-
turies had increasingly come under question, if not under direct attack, 
from all sorts of adverse or heterodox tendencies within and outside Indian 
society. Asceticism, yoga, renunciation of social life-forms, and various kinds 
of esoteric practices had begun to emerge, and these posed challenges to the 
Brahmanical orthodox system. Buddhism and J ainism created conditions, 
in large part, for these tendencies to emerge and flourish. 
There were already internal tensions also, for ritualism and the promises 
it made (i.e. that sacrificial performance that results in obtaining spiritual 
and material favors from the gods) led to disenchantment of one sort or 
another, particularly on the part of those who were, by virtue of their caste 
status, deprived of the privilege of performing sacrifices or having them 
performed for them. The ascetic orders among the brahmins were late 
in developing (closer to the Christian era) and even then the orthodox of 
the orthodox, represented by the MImatpsa, or school of ritual exegetes 
(hermeneutics), held out against the movement. Some of the orders were 
atheistic (like the Mlmatp.sa itself), or at least decidedly non-theistic (like the 
Buddhist and Jain heterodoxy). 
The institution of renunciation (saf11nyiisa, or self-banishment in ascetic 
reclusivity), based on the rejection of the social order and the affirmation of 
a more individualistic life-form, further undermines the orthodox Brahmanic 
hegemony of the normative. Yoga served better the purpose of ascetic 
renunciation than the ritualistic orthodoxy, although the philosophical 
Upanishads, with their metaphysicallogocentricism, had already absorbed 
much of the spiritual elements of yoga (meditation, contemplation, askesis, 
asceticism, or self-abnegation). However, the Upanishads could not reconcile 
themselves with the prevailing popular religious practices, such as worship 
(puja) of the myriad of iconic and mythological gods or even God outside 
the Vedic ritual-sacrificial context (even if only symbolically - given that 
the Vedic gods were uniconic and did not themselves appeal to the pop-
ular mythological imaginary as happened later, in the Pura:Q.ic (medieval) 
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and post-epic traditions (particularly in the imagery of Rama, Krishna, 
the monkey-god Hanuman, and so on)). The Upanishads further could 
not tolerate involvement in all kinds of activities despite caste and class 
structures. Various sects adopted differing ,practices and principles, and 
these caused further embarrassment to the orthodoxy. But there emerged 
deeper structural disquiet and questioning, and also interpolations of Vedic 
values. More significantly, the exclusion of the other entailed in the monism 
and detached morality of the Upanishads surfaces in the epic ethics; this is 
taken to a new epistemological and a~theologic critique, in particular, in the 
Bhagavad-Gftii. 
The post-Vedic tradition had vexed equivocation over the imperative 
to act and to abandon action altogether in consonance with the emerging 
culture of yoga, with its proclivity towards sa1p.nyiisa (renunciation) and 
asceticism (qua srama1}a). When one sacrifices, one performs a certain act; 
however, in the actual "gifting" of elements (requisite ingredients) into the 
sacrificial pit aimed towards the heavens or the gods, one is also abandoning 
one's claim and invested interest in the material accoutrements devoured as 
it were by the etheric emergence of the mantra-evoked god or gods. How~ 
ever, which of the two moments counts as the true act of sacrifice? If, to turn 
to an example much discussed in postmodem literature, death is a "gift," 
then surely the giving up of one's attachment to life and living (perhaps for 
the otherlthe Other/Infinity) counts as the true act of sacrifice here, not the 
actual physical or clinical act of dying. Later exegetical tradition derived too 
rigid a nuance from the signifier of yajiia (sacrifice), rendering it simply as 
the act of "giving up," or abandoning, which may well result also in non~ 
action (as when we say "I have sacrificed my work for some needed rest"). 
The term that might have been more specific and appropriate for the actual 
gesture of abandoning, renouncing, the ingredients from one's hands into 
the altar, namely, tyiiga, came in the deconstructive Indian epic~ethics to 
signify abandonment, or rather more technically renunciation (salfUlyiisa) of 
all involvement in action. This hermeneutical shift is all but complete by the 
time of the Bhagavad-Gitii. 
However, Arjuna is perplexed over a statement made by Krishna, the 
speaking A vaHira in the epic, that seems to exhort both the Vedic injunction 
to act (kuru karma) and to abandon action (tyiiga karma). Which one does 
he really favor, and which of the two is truly beneficial? As would be expected, 
Krishna is clearly in favor of karma - even though he tags the suffix "yoga" 
to it, hence karma yoga - in contradiction to karmasa1p.nyiisa, which itself is 
to be abandoned, or put under epoche (BG 2.39). As Woods notes: 
This change of emphasis has to do with the reversal of Upani~adic 
values brought about by the bhakti [devotional movements] attempt 
to extend the prospect of salvation to all (including women) ... 
The action advocated by Kn:Q.a is no longer undertaken for the 
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toward a "single-minded motivational purpose" (vyavasayatmika buddhir 
ekeha, BG 2.41). Thus, for the Bhagavad-Gftii, as for the Mimatpsa, the right-
ful discharge of dharma entails the performance of certain duties; but these 
duties need not be seen in any absolute sense as in the rite-based prerogative. 
The categorical imperative or the stricter reading of Vedic injunctions as 
mandatory that we find underwritten in the M""lIn8.tpsa exegesis is considerably 
weakened in the Bhagavad-Gfta's discourse of ni$kiima karma, or disinterested 
action, for such a class of voluntary actions is still of a type intended variously 
to purify the mind (sattvaSuddhi), to please the gods (fSvaraprlti), and, most 
importantly, to contribute to the welfare of all beings (lokasaf!lgraha). In 
other words, the context is one of deconstruction of the orthopraxy and a 
decisive move towards the enigma of alterity. This enigma takes two forms 
or has two "faces," that of the human and that of the Infinite as well, as we 
have described earlier, bringing in the strong context of bhakti or devotion. 
These heteronymous actions are not on a par with prescriptive rites of the 
Vedic acts, but they stem from one's own svadharma, or the self's involve-
ment in all modes of welfare, one's own and others'. 
Now the notion of svadharma, which in the Bhagavad-Glta receives a 
gallant endorsement, on the face of it might appear to be somewhat akin to 
Kant's notion of moral autonomy. However, the Bhagavad-Gitii's notion, 
while it forms the basis of moral action, is not an abstract consequence that 
results from its critical method, but is a quasi-subjective category referring 
to the innate characteristics of the individual, which she has according to 
her nature, here termed svabhtiva (self-nature). 
In a sense the above combines both a formal and a material function. 
Svadharma tells one that one ought to do what one ought to do with regard 
to whatever is true to one's nature (svabhiiva); and this is formal, as Krishna 
pronounces: "Better one's duty (though) imperfect, than another's well-
performed" (BG 3.35). But the content of this duty with regard to what is 
one's nature is promptly specified by the Bhagavad-Gftii in terms, not of the 
psychological properties of the individual but) rather, of the empirically 
determined social placement or status of the individual. In other words, 
svadharma is ascertained by reference to the normative rules of that society, 
and that may be, as is certainly the case here, the particular class division 
and its encumbent duties and obligations. Hence one's svadharma is deter-
mined within the web of the dharma-karma dynamic, that is to say, the 
prescribed role in the interrelated network known as dharma. And one does 
this without regard to consequences or rewards, that is to say, in a spirit of 
detachment by renouncing the fruits of the action. Surely again, the Kantian 
maxim, "duty for duty's sake" rings true here as well, but the difference is 
precisely in the way in which these duties are determined and legitimated. 
(Kant, in the final analysis, resorts to utilitarian considerations, the Bhagavad~ 
GItii to a transcendental telos; in fact, it would be better restated, again, as 
"duty for dharma's sake.") 
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The Vita, however, is not bound simply to the discourse of duties, for the 
idea of adhikiira (entitlement or intentional agency) had already opened up 
other possibilities and claims that might run counter to the "rites ethic" it 
attempts to rescue, albeit in a broader context of socially beneficial action. 
In this regard the Gitii presents an interesting variance on the nuance 
attached to adhikara in its own rather deceptive and delicate use of the term. 
I do not wish the treatment that follows on adhikara to be seen as a pre-
occupation with the' apparent cognate notion of "rights" (in the modem 
Western sense), but rather for its use in the Indian context to undermine 
traditional grounding of norms on a very determined and deterministic found-
ing where the heteronymous will was subjected more to the whims (andlor 
approval) of the gods than on the freedom-presupposed self-nature of the 
individual agent. And this I do by focusing on a very important verse in the 
alta (2.47): karma1;lyeviidhikiiraraste mii phale,yu kadlicana, which we believe 
is best read as: "You have entitlement indeed to actions, never though to 
the results (fruits or expected rewards)." There is a shift from the need 
to perform and carry out actions as a matter of ··law" to the intentionality 
in the motivation toward such an action, or non-action, which is matter of 
conscience. Arjuna here is being told that since he (Arjuna) belongs to the 
warrior group, his adhikara is to the act (which a warrior performs), and he 
has no claim on the results that mayor may not follow. He is further told, 
by implication, that he has no entitlement not to do the act that has to be 
done; that is to say, he has no right to desist from what is (by his self-nature) 
encumbent upon him as a k,yatriya or member of the warrior caste. 
While it may appear that the alta is confusing the locution of duties 
with that of rights (understood as entitlements, let us concede), the move is 
deliberate, because the author(s) here is attempting to introduce the idea 
of "negative entitlements," which effectively states that no one, including 
oneself, can rightfully interfere with what is one's due or desert by virtue of 
the law (of dharma). Thus, if action Z is one's due, then so be it; this is one's 
entitlement and nothing should be permitted to erode its fulfillment. By 
shifting the focus from results or fruits to action, the weight of the entitle-
ment is also shown to fall rather on the side of action than on the side of 
the fruit. The Gita problematizes the direction in which the latter leads 
to antinomies rather than a contribution to dharma. That is to say, one's 
motivation to act in the interest of desired consequences can lead to con-
flicts between desire and the purpose or end to be fulfilled in undertaking 
the act. Thus if one's incentive to work or research is basically to collect the 
pay-check at the end of each fortnight, then this is not really fulfilling 
the call of duty in respect of the larger interest, goals, and incentives to 
make a contribution to the field and to knowledge. 
The Gltii is far from explicit in defending dharma, for dharma's sake, or 
at least it does wish to respect the autonomy of the individual and uphold 
the discourse of freedom (mok.ra) above that of unmitigated duty. And so it 
3S 
PURUSHOTTAMA BILIMORIA 
attacks the persistent ritualistic and ascetic discourse for its own decon· 
structive ends. And the Gita also wants to disabuse people of the false idea 
that they have any entitlement to the fruits of action anyway - which is the 
reason for asking Arjuna to renounce the fruits (phala-tyaga) and not the 
other way round. This notion of tyaga is not directly borrowed, as generally 
said, from the sarrmyiisin (renouncer) tradition, but in a qualified sense from 
the philosophical Mimrupsa, which stressed the giving up of (or abandoning 
from one's own hand) the dravya or substances (such as soma) used in the 
sacrifice. The alternative discourse of renunciation which the Gita wants to 
legitimate would gain greater strength from the locution of adhikara which 
the MirnaIPsa had got going than it would through any borrowings from 
the salflnyiisa direction. But scholars and commentators, especially of the 
Vedanta-bhakti scholastic ilk, have concentrated far too exclusively on tyiiga 
(which does not appear in this verse) rather than on adhikiira. Still, one can 
see that the metaphysical instability of much of the Vedic normative frame-
work becomes tropes for deconstruction and erasure in the Gita; and thus 
the circumspection began in the DharmaSiistras is continued in a deeper, 
more philosophical and self-critical way. Without such a self-reflexive pro-
cess a tradition simply cannot move forward in its ethical advancement. 
We would venture to suggest that the Bhagavad-Gita came very close to 
opening up the earlier notion of adhikiira towards a notion of rights (for 
whatever it is worth) in the Brahmanical context (for it certainly stretches 
the erstwhile concept of entitlements beyond the scope intended in earlier 
texts). It draws its guiding impetus from Mimatpsa hermeneutics (or nyaya) 
and seeks to apply it beyond the framework of sacrificial and religious rites 
to the broader context of social dharma (and in war scenarios also). But 
beyond this it could not go, for good historical reasons. The Gita would 
have to accept the fundamental idea that all persons are born equal and 
that nature does not endow differential markings on the individual which 
immediately translate into social differentiations. It does, though, concede 
another kind of adhikiira to all people (one presumes) in the art of bhakti or 
devotion, for Krishna promises to pay heed to whomsoever comes to him 
with a flower, a leaf, water, and a mind fixed on him alone, etc. But this 
overture towards a more universal adhiklira is constrained in the social 
context by the overbearing weight of varQiiSramadharma ("caste" structure) 
and an orthodoxy that could 'barely face reconciling itself with the challenges 
of the incipient individualism inherent in the systems of yoga-asceticism and 
Buddhism (through its denial of the caste structure if not of atman also). 
Thus the response of the Gfta is restrained and calculated; it merely suggests 
the possibility of a discourse of universal human rights (manava-sarviidhikiira) 
but does not develop it. 
It is on the basis of the heteronymous freedom of will recognized and 
underscored in the Gita that the later bhakti sants (bards or "saints"), espe-
cially Kabir, Rat Das and Tukaram, Guru Niinak (the founder of Sikhism), 
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Mirabai, and Narshi Mehta appealed to some notion of universality on the 
issue of the eligibility to devotional practice. This more humanistic strain 
helped to cut across caste and gender harriers and overcome the prejudices 
or prerogatives of the "twice-born." Just as for the Buddha a brahma1}.a 
(brahmin) is one who is noble by disposition rather than by birth) for the 
medieval sants anyone who gives herself to Hari (the Lord) has the adhikiira 
to devotion and will undoubtedly find Him (Kabir, 1951,41-2). Kabn- added 
further momentum to this universality by proclaiming that (i) the real sanc-
tum sanetorum is not in the enclosure of the temple, or by the Ganga (the 
Ganges River), or in Dvaraka (Krishna's legendary home), as most pandits 
would have people believe, but it is in the heart (hrdaya) of each individual, 
and (ii) there is no difference between the isvara (Godhead) of the Hindu 
and Allah of the Muslim. By implication and in principle the Muslim has as 
much adhikara as the brahmin has, and vice versa. 
This is the juncture where Gandhi's social philosophy made its pivotal 
contribution. His immense sensitivity to the disadvantaged, the minorities, 
the "untouchables" (in the surviving caste ordering, in which he included 
and extended his support to the African American struggle in North America 
as well), and to women, would not have been possible had the traditional 
normative framework not been interrupted and the ethically significant 
circle expanded. Gandhi relied heavily on the Gfla to extend his political 
strategies to those excluded from the hegemonic order. And for this he 
almost forged an alternative reading of the text, shifting it out of the histor-
ical and warfare genre to one of allegorical and intensely moral teachings 
(Jordens, 1986, 89-90; cf. Woods, 2001, 9-10). Dharma to him no longer 
sufficed as the arid concept of the ritualistic and legalistic normative that 
privileged one class or caste over another, but rather a social praxis in which 
an individual exercised and cultivated certain virtuous dispositions in rela-
tion precisely to the other. 
Just as Levinas drew his inspiration from Martin Buber's "1-Thou" 
ethico-theology, Gandhi also found Buber's other-regarding teachings to be 
exemplary and a corrective to modernity's fetish with strident individualism 
(Dalton, 1993, 228).7 While in his early reading of the Gita, Gandhi thought 
warfare to be consistent with the dharma normative inasmuch as a warrior 
must follow through his caste duties in an act of selfless own-dharma 
(svadharma) , later on he shifted his position to give preeminence to the 
principle of nonviolence (ahif11sii) as a key derivation from the now more 
transcendentalized understanding of dharma. Dharma is not just about rites, 
privileges, duties, laws, prohibitions (hence exclusions), but has the hetero-
nymous character of both preparing the grounds through praxis of positive 
virtues (observances, vows, non-injury, satyiigraha or truth-making, and 
self~regulative restraints) and enabling a more empathic and compassionate 
and empowering disposition towards the other. The latter inexorably led 
him to articulate a discourse of rights reciprocal to duties: hence "the brown 
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men's rights over the colonial masters' exclusivistic privileges," and the rights 
of all citizens as equal to each other. Gandhi inspired and unleashed a whole 
nationalist movement and struggle for India's - and of much of the colonized 
world's - freedom from Europe's "raw othering"% of the non-European 
based on the seemingly simple teachings of the Gita on dharma. He shifted 
the paradigm from the scholastic-dogmatic normativity of bygone centuries 
to a more (already) post-Enlightenment recognition of the broader moral 
responsibility that subjects have towards the other qua subjects. And here 
one is ready at hand with a "gift" of oneself in face of the other, and not as 
a means to some further individualistic or corporate or communal ends (in 
the sense of divisive community identity politics). 
Here the project of injecting sensitivity to the ethic of'"alterity" in modern 
Indian philosophy comes full circle - from Vedic dana (the "gift of sacri-
fice") to adhikara, which finds its way into the Indian Constitution as well 
under the section on the Fundamental [Bill of Human/Moral] Rights; but 
the project has only just begun: the modern Indian intelligentsia, its agents 
in the media, and much of neo-colonialism's secularized middle-class bene-
ficiaries, alas, have deferred or foreclosed this challenge in deference to the 
creation of a "Hindutva" state first and foremost, based on medieval pro-
clivity towards the normative, at the exclusion as much of theory as of the 
"other" - be that the Muslim, or women, or the disadvantaged from the 
"lower" rungs of caste and ranks in the politics of caste. There is, however, 
reason to feel hopeful - as long as hard deconstructive thinking on ethics 
goes on, in India, in modem Indian law, in Indian and comparative philo-
sophy, and in the minds of people with some power and position in the 
global context. 
Notes 
* This chapter is dedicated to conversations between Renuka Shama and William 
Edeglass; and myself somewhat on the margins. I wish to express gratitude to 
Professor Y ouru Wang and Chris John Zvokel for assisting with the final editing. 
1 For further discussion and a hermeneutic-linguistic basis of the philosophical 
thesis underpinning the claim, see Bilimoria, 1998, 315-19. 
2 Some vague anticipations are inscribed in the modular of the gods - but perhaps 
too early for human beings ~ in the J,?gVeda II.28.11; V.85.S; X.lO.4; X.113.4; 
X.117. Cf. Kane, 1986-9, vol. I, i, 4. 
3 See Mohanty, 1995, 8. 
4 Duncan, here, is drawing from Levinas in his "Enigma and Phenomena"; see 
Levinas, 1996, 65ff. 
5 The Mahlibhlirata. itself a monumental epic work, comprising some 100,000 
stanzas, is said to be the longest single poem produced in human history (in that 
respect compares with Homer's The Iliad and Ulysses). As the paramount epic 
in the tradition, it includes a vast number of legends, accounts of cosmogony 
(beginnings of the universe), theogony. mystico~religious and philosophical specula-
tions, as well as tracts on law, jurisprudence, and the duties of the warrior caste 
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(k:jatriya) vis-a-vis other castes groups, and principally the royal-kingly caste. The 
text is usually taken to indicate the greater narrative of the episodes of the Bharatas 
(a legendary patriarch of what could have been ancient India). The composition 
and compilation of the epic probably began around the sixth or seventh century 
BCE and was completed around 200 BCE, in w,hich period the the Bhagavad-G'itii 
seems to have been introduced. Although the authorship is attributed to Vyasa, a 
legendary figure (like Manu), it is believed that the work is a result of several 
hands. with various interpolations and redactions and parallel reCensions evolving 
in subsequent periods. The translations for the Bhagavad-Gfta verses cited in this 
chapter, whether by Sargeant, Woods, or the author, are all based on the Critical 
Edition issued from the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute as The Mahabhliratafor the 
First Time Critically Edited, 1933-66. 
6 See Woods, 2001, 10, 71, 73. 
7 Martin Buber and J.L. Magnes, Two Letters to Gandhi, April 1939, cited in Dalton, 
1993, 228. See also Gandhi's exchanges with other Jews, which Dalton discusses 
on pp. 134-8. 
8 Kant specifically refers to the native peoples in various parts of the world who 
have not as yet been embraced by or entered or evolved into the Enlightenment's 
Reason, as the "raw man": they presumably eat "raw," and think in the "raw." 
See Bilimoria, 2002. 
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